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This article investigates the moderating effect of politi-
cal affinity between countries on investors' reactions to
the premium in cross-border acquisitions (CBAs).
Based on a sample of 1,183 CBAs between 1999 and
2018, we find that political affinity positively moderates
the relationship between the acquisition premium and
the acquiring and target firms' stock market return. We
argue that investors use political affinity to assess the
reliability of the premium (i.e., management's overall
perception of a given deal's synergistic potential). This
is in line with prior literature reasoning that, unlike
strong political affinity, weak political affinity increases
the likelihood of government intervention, decreases
the likelihood of deal completion, and results in higher
premiums to mitigate the previous effects, thus poten-
tially increasing the likelihood of value destruction.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Previous studies on mergers & acquisitions (M&A) announcements have primarily shown
negative abnormal returns (i.e., value destruction) for acquirer shareholders (Moeller,
Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2004) and positive abnormal returns for target shareholders
(Jensen & Ruback, 1983).1 In this line of research, the premium paid by the acquiring firm
has gained considerable attention concerning the explanation of the announcement returns
(Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2005), as the premium
reflects management's overall perception (i.e., expectation) of a given deal's synergistic
potential (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Laamanen, 2007). The premium is found to be posi-
tively related to abnormal returns of the target firm, as it represents a bid price above the
market value of the shares (Díaz, Azofra, & Gutiérrez, 2009). Then again, it is negatively
related to abnormal returns of the acquiring firm because high premiums may signal
potential overpayments (Varaiya & Ferris, 1987).
As management has informational advantages over investors, the latter must assess the reli-
ability of the information provided by the former (Zhang & Wiersema, 2009). This is all the
more relevant as in many cases, acquisitions destroy acquirer value (King, Dalton, Daily, &
Covin, 2004). The premium, representing information on management's overall perception of a
given deal's synergistic potential, is therefore evaluated by investors in terms of its credibility
based on additional public information. In this vein, Schijven and Hitt (2012) show that inves-
tors use factors such as industry similarity, payment method, and acquirer performance to
assess the reliability of management's perception. As we posit that cross-border acquisitions
(CBAs) are comparatively complex organizational events (i.e., in contrast to domestic acquisi-
tions), the central aim of our article is to deepen the understanding of what information inves-
tors use in this type of acquisition to assess the reliability of the acquisition premium. Similar to
Schijven and Hitt (2012), we choose a moderation analysis to address this.
We hypothesize that political affinity — reflecting the similarity of national interests in
global affairs — between acquirer and target firm countries moderates the relationship between
the premium and abnormal announcement returns in CBAs. Our results show that political
affinity, measured as similarity in voting behavior in the UN General Assembly (Gartzke, 1998),
positively moderates the relationship between acquisition premium and announcement returns.
Specifically, we find that target shareholders' reaction to the acquisition premium is more posi-
tive (higher positive cumulative abnormal returns) when political affinity between acquirer and
target countries is strong. As previous studies show that weak political affinity increases the
likelihood of government intervention (Bertrand, Betschinger, & Settles, 2016) and thus
decreases the likelihood of deal completion (Zhang & He, 2014), our results may be viewed as
empirical evidence that political affinity moderates target investors' reaction due to the per-
ceived risk of government intervention.2 Furthermore, we find that the acquirer shareholders'
1That said, a few studies find the opposite. For instance, McCarthy, Dolfsma, and Weitzel (2016) identify positive
abnormal returns for Chinese overseas acquisitions. Shapiro and Li (2016) attribute this positive outcome to country-
level heterogeneity (i.e., differences in political/cultural characteristics as well as formal and informal institutions).
Then again, Young (2016) argues the positive reaction may also be at least partly a result of Chinese investors'
optimistic view regardless of the mergers' prospects for success.
2We acknowledge that there are also government interventions in favor of the acquisition, although perhaps less
common.
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reaction to the acquisition premium is weaker (less negative cumulative abnormal returns)
when political affinity is strong.3 Previous studies show that foreign acquirers must ensure that
the offer price is high enough for the target not to resist the bid (Graham & Marchick, 2006)
and to reduce the potential risk of government intervention (Bertrand et al., 2016) especially
when political affinity is weak. Therefore, our results may be viewed as empirical evidence that
political affinity moderates acquirer investors' reactions to the perceived risk of overpayment
(and therefore value destruction).
We thus contribute to the literature on the behavioral dimension of investor reactions to
acquisition announcements. Specifically, we extend Schijven and Hitt (2012) in providing
empirical evidence that in CBAs, with an arguably more complex information setting than in
domestic acquisitions, investors incorporate political affinity when assessing the reliability of
management's perception of a given deal's synergistic potential. Our results suggest that man-
agement may to some extent be able to manage investor reactions by disclosing sufficiently
detailed information to augment the salient but often crude signals that are available to inves-
tors (particularly in CBAs with additional complexity arising from bilateral political affairs).
Our article also contributes to an emerging body of work that accounts for heterogeneity in
bilateral relations (e.g., Arikan & Shenkar, 2013; Bertrand et al., 2016; Levine, Lin, & Shen, 2020;
Li, Arikan, Shenkar, & Arikan, 2020; Li, Meyer, Zhang, & Ding, 2018; Zhang & He, 2014) which has
long been neglected in research on CBAs (Li et al., 2020). Prior work has mainly focused on institu-
tional factors (Aybar & Ficici, 2009) and cross-cultural differences (Chakrabarti, Gupta-Mukherjee, &
Jayaraman, 2009) to determine the factors underlying CBA value creation, or on country-specific
political risk (Dinc & Erel, 2013). In showing that investors incorporate political affinity when
assessing the reliability of management's perception of a given deal's synergistic potential, our article
is particularly closely related to Bertrand et al. (2016) who show that managers also incorporate
political affinity when preparing an offer.
The remainder is structured as follows. In the next section, we develop our hypotheses.
Then we present our data, method, and results. We conclude with a discussion of our
findings.
2 | HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Firms initiate M&A deals above all for one reason: to create value (Xie, Reddy, & Liang, 2017).
Value equals the total synergy that the acquisition is expected to yield minus the premium
paid by the acquirer (Schijven & Hitt, 2012). From the perspective of the shareholders of the
target firm, the acquisition premium captures the magnitude of the bid price being above
the shares' market value (Díaz et al., 2009). Therefore, every dollar spent on the premium
increases the potential amount of cash in target shareholders' pockets. In line with this
argument, Díaz et al. (2009) indeed find a positive relationship between the premium and
the abnormal announcement returns of the target firm. However, the likelihood of deal
completion critically depends on the likelihood of government intervention in favor of
the target. Previous literature has shown that government intervention occurs more often if
the acquirer is from a different country than the target firm (Dinc & Erel, 2013) and that the
3To get a better grasp of this line of reasoning, let us assume that two CBAs involve (the payment of) an identical
premium but differ in terms of political affinity (i.e., strong vs. weak). In this case, we expect target shareholders to react
more positively to the premium if political affinity were strong, which we indeed find as an empirical result.
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likelihood of government intervention also depends on the political affinity between the acquirer
and target countries (Bertrand et al., 2016). Here, political affinity denotes the similarity of national
interests in global affairs. Weak political affinity increases the likelihood of political and economic
conflict (Dixon & Moon, 1993; Gartzke, 2000). In the context of CBAs, it increases the likelihood
of government intervention in favor of the domestic target because firms based in countries that
share a political affinity are less likely to be perceived as a threat (Bertrand et al., 2016). We there-
fore hypothesize that political affinity positively affects the target firm's shareholders' response to
the acquisition premium. Formally, we state:
Hypothesis (H1). Political affinity between acquirer and target countries positively
moderates the relationship between the acquisition premium and the target firm's
stock market return to an acquisition announcement.
From the perspective of the acquiring firm's shareholders, a comparison of the premium
and the potential synergy suggests whether value is created or destroyed. Therefore, every dollar
spent on the premium increases the likelihood of value destruction, resulting in negative stock
returns of the acquiring firm to an acquisition announcement (Schijven & Hitt, 2012). To assess
potential value destruction, investors evaluate the credibility of the premium, which represents
the information that management discloses on its overall perception of a given deal's synergistic
potential. Although prior literature suggests that value creation is the main motive for M&A
activities (e.g., Seth, Song, & Pettit, 2000), it also shows that other motives like agency
issues (Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison, 2009), self-interest-seeking behav-
ior (Jensen, 1989), overconfidence (Malmendier & Tate, 2008), or hubris (Hayward &
Hambrick, 1997) can influence management's decisions on M&A activities, thus putting into
question the unbiasedness of the premium. In CBAs, that unbiasedness is additionally chal-
lenged by political affinity: Target firms are more likely able to oppose foreign acquisitions by
leveraging government intervention when political affinity is weak. As governments can decide
to interfere in the acquisition process either on their initiative or upon request of the target
(Bertrand et al., 2016), foreign acquirers must ensure that the offer price is high enough for the
target not to resist the bid (Graham & Marchick, 2006). Weak political affinity hence increases
the premium and makes it more likely for an acquisition to destroy rather than create value
(Haunschild, 1994; Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). We therefore hypothesize that political affin-
ity positively affects the acquiring firm's shareholders' response to the acquisition premium.
Hypothesis (H2). Political affinity between acquirer and target countries positively
moderates the relationship between the acquisition premium and the acquiring
firm's stock market return to an acquisition announcement.
3 | DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The M&A data are retrieved from Thomson Financial's SDC Platinum database. We collect
CBAs that were either completed or withdrawn. We obtain data on stock returns and firm char-
acteristics from CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices), Compustat, Refinitiv
Datastream, and Refinitiv Worldscope. As described in detail in the Appendix S1, this data
merge results in a total of 1,183 acquisitions from 1999 to 2018 representing CBAs from
43 unique acquirer countries and 55 unique target countries.
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Our dependent variable is cumulated abnormal returns (CARs), which represent the portion
of the return that is left unexplained by an economic model. As the purpose of such an eco-
nomic model in an event study is to isolate the incremental impact of an event (e.g., acquisition
announcement) on securities price performance, recent literature uses multifactor models to
estimate abnormal returns. Multifactor models are better able to distinguish the event from
known determinants of stock price performance than the market model (Kothari &
Warner, 2007), which is widely used in earlier event studies. We use all six factors (market, size,
book-to-market, momentum, investment, and operating profitability-based factors) from the
factor models of Carhart (1997) as well as Fama and French (2015) to determine abnormal
returns. All factors are retrieved from Kenneth R. French's website.4 The estimation window
runs from 210 to 11 days before the event to ensure a sufficient estimation period and a gap
between estimation and event window (Moeller et al., 2004). As our dependent variable, we use
the CARs from 1 day before to 1 day after the announcement, with the announcement day
being the focal day (Li et al., 2020).
Our first independent variable of interest is the initial acquisition premium. We follow
Haunschild (1994), Dinc and Erel (2013), and Bertrand et al. (2016) and use the ratio of the ini-
tial offer price over the closing stock price 4 weeks before the announcement. Based on the find-
ings from previous studies, Bertrand et al. (2016) recommend using a 4-week period since
information could leak earlier and distort the effect. Our second independent main variable of
interest is political affinity. We follow prior literature (Bertrand et al., 2016; Gartzke, 1998; Li
et al., 2020) and determine political affinity by the voting behavior between two countries in the
UN General Assembly. The data used to calculate political affinity are provided by Voeten,
Strezhnev, and Bailey (2009). Building on the measure of Bertrand et al. (2016), we create a con-
tinuous variable (political affinity C) that ranges between zero and one. A value of one (zero)
represents completely consistent (opposite) voting behavior between two countries in the UN
General Assembly and thus strong (weak) political affinity. While the relationship between the
United States and the United Kingdom is an example of strong political affinity, the relation-
ship between the United States and China is an example of weak political affinity.5 As a second
measure of political affinity, we create a time-varying dummy (political affinity D) which is one
if the identical voting behavior of two nations dominates opposite voting behavior (strong politi-
cal affinity) and zero otherwise (weak political affinity). As dichotomization provides us with a
more conservative approximation of political affinity, it allows us to investigate whether our
results critically depend on the variable construction. Based on prior research we employ a vast
variety of control variables, which can be divided into two subsets: deal- and firm-level charac-
teristics. Deal-level controls include a tender offer dummy (Rossi & Volpin, 2004), a hostile
takeover dummy (Bertrand et al., 2016), a poison pill dummy (Schwert, 2000), a stock payment
dummy (Shleifer & Vishny, 2003), a competing offer dummy (Walkling & Edmister, 1985), a
dummy indicating whether the acquirer and target are in the same SIC industry,6 as well as the
4http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
5Recent political tensions between the United States and China and related disagreements on bilateral and multilateral
political issues highlight how political affinity may affect CBAs; a case in point is the attempted acquisition of the
Chinese firm TikTok by the U.S. firm Microsoft (https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/26/technology/tiktoks-microsoft-
deal-soap-opera-trump.html?auth=login-facebook) or the (blocked) Chinese firm Beijing Shiji Information Technology's
acquisition of the U.S. target firm StayNTouch (https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/06/business/economy/trump-
administration-blocks-chinese-acquisition-cfius.html).
6To identify whether the acquirer and target are in the same SIC industry, we use the SIC2 industry classification
following Cao, Li, and Liu (2019).
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relative size of target and acquirer (Jarrell & Poulsen, 1989). Regarding acquirer and target firm
characteristics, we control for size (Erel, Liao, & Weisbach, 2012), Tobin's Q (Moeller
et al., 2005), leverage (Maloney, McCormick, & Mitchell, 1993), and profitability7 (Bertrand
et al., 2016). In addition to these two sets of control variables, we employ year, country,8 and
industry fixed effects. The latter is based on the Fama and French (1997) 48 industry
classifications.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the above variables from our 1,183 acquisition events
separately based on the value of the political affinity dummy of an event (i.e., weak vs. strong politi-
cal affinity). The cumulative abnormal returns of the acquirers are higher when political affinity is
strong (p = .091). We find that acquirers and targets exhibit higher Tobin's Q values when political
affinity is weak (p = .046 and .029, respectively). This implies that primarily valuable firms accept
the risk associated with these acquisitions and only valuable firms are acquired, in turn indicating
that less valuable firms neither accept these risks nor are worth taking the risk. Political affinity also





Weak vs. strong political
affinity
Mean SD Mean SD Diff. p value
Acquirer CAR −0.008 0.075 0.003 0.075 −0.011 .091
Target CAR 0.259 0.454 0.226 0.261 0.032 .200
Acquisition premium 0.407 0.402 0.418 0.421 −0.011 .761
Tender offer 0.410 0.493 0.441 0.497 −0.031 .470
Hostile offer 0.026 0.159 0.030 0.171 −0.005 .755
Poison pill 0.019 0.138 0.011 0.103 0.009 .360
Stock payment 0.064 0.246 0.197 0.398 −0.133 .000
Competing bidder 0.045 0.208 0.100 0.301 −0.055 .026
Same industry 0.603 0.491 0.633 0.482 −0.030 .465
Relative size 0.303 1.790 0.320 2.474 −0.017 .934
Target size 12.617 1.796 12.802 2.103 −0.184 .299
Target Tobin's Q 2.424 3.515 1.883 2.770 0.541 .029
Target leverage 0.134 0.173 0.198 0.206 −0.064 .000
Target profitability 0.082 0.196 0.039 0.230 0.043 .028
Acquirer size 15.568 2.255 15.466 2.262 0.101 .601
Acquirer Tobin's Q 1.671 1.228 1.432 1.419 0.240 .046
Acquirer leverage 0.227 0.163 0.247 0.172 −0.020 .181
Acquirer profitability 0.094 0.177 0.088 0.144 0.007 .604
7We follow Bertrand et al. (2016) and measure profitability as EBITDA over total assets.
8With country fixed effects (acquirer [target] country fixed effects when the dependent variable is the acquirer [target]
CARs), we implicitly also capture intervention likelihood to some extent. Yet as the intervention likelihood for a specific
country could also change over time, we additionally control for the intervention likelihood of the target's firm country
(both target's and acquirer's country to be even more conservative). Our main results continue to hold.
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seems to be related to how the CBAs are executed. For instance, we find that cash payments (stock
payments) are more (less) common if political affinity is weak (p = .000), suggesting that target
firms try to avoid stock payments if this is the case.
4 | RESULTS
To test our two hypotheses, we follow the analysis in Schijven and Hitt (2012) and use a fixed-
effects model to regress the cumulative abnormal returns on the premium and the interaction term
between the premium and political affinity (moderator). Table 2 presents our main results. Models
(1) to (4) show the results for political affinity as a dummy variable (political affinity D), and models
(5) to (8) show them for political affinity as a continuous variable (political affinity C).
We first report the results without any interaction effects of political affinity to ensure com-
parability to prior studies. We present the results in models (1) and (3) (models (5) and (7))
using political affinity as a standalone binary (continuous) variable (i.e., not interacted with the
acquisition premium). As expected from previous studies, we find positive coefficients of
the acquisition premium on CARs from targets (models (1) and (5)) (p = .000). Thus, the acqui-
sition premium positively affects the target firm's stock market return to an acquisition
announcement, which is in line with the results from previous studies. However, in the case of
acquirers (models (3) and (7)), we do not find a statistically significant effect on CARs from
acquirers (coeff.: −.007; p = .303). Furthermore, we find no evidence of a direct effect of politi-
cal affinity on CARs since the coefficients on political affinity are insignificant.
Next, we analyze whether political affinity moderates the effect of the premium on stock
returns, which we expect with H1 and H2. Models (2) and (6) for the target as well as models
(4) and (8) for the acquirer additionally consider the interaction between the acquisition pre-
mium and political affinity. Here, our variable of interest is the interaction term between politi-
cal affinity and the acquisition premium.9 As both political affinity variables are constructed in
such a way that higher values represent strong(er) political affinity, we expect the coefficients of
the interaction term to be positive if the relationship between the acquisition premium and the
target/acquirer firm's stock market return to an acquisition announcement is positively moder-
ated by political affinity between the acquirer and target countries (H1 and H2).
We indeed find empirical evidence in line with both hypotheses. For both acquirer and tar-
get, the coefficients of the interaction term are positive and statistically significant. Further-
more, we find that our results are not particularly sensitive to how we construct the political
affinity variable, as the interaction term remains significantly positive no matter whether we
include political affinity as a binary or continuous variable. When we additionally consider the
interaction plots shown in Figure 1 (2) to better understand the economic significances for
the target (acquirer) using political affinity as a continuous variable, we see a considerable mod-
eration effect of political affinity for both acquirer and target CARs. The acquisition premium is
only significantly positive (negative) for target (acquirer) CAR when political affinity is strong
(weak) and indistinguishable from zero otherwise. For the target, we find a marginally
9We are less interested in the standalone term premium, as it does not capture an average effect as in linear-additive
regression models (Brambor, Clark, & Golder, 2006). It only captures the effect of premium on CARs when political
affinity equals zero. On the contrary, the interaction term of political affinity and premium shows how the marginal
effect of a premium on CARs is moderated by political affinity (which is the main research objective of this study). For a
more intuitive interpretation, we refer to Figures 1 and 2 which present the marginal effect of premium on CARs for all
values of political affinity within the defined value range [0;1].
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significant effect of the premium when political affinity is strong (marginal effect of premium
significant at p = .1 or less when political affinity ranges between .79 and 1) and no significant
effect when political affinity is (rather) weak (marginal effect of premium insignificant with
p values above .1 when political affinity ranges between 0 and .78). In relative terms, we find
for strong political affinity (=1) that a one–SD increase in acquisition premium translates into a
46.7% increase10 in target CAR relative to the SD of target CAR, which we argue to be an eco-
nomically meaningful effect size. Then again, for acquirer CAR, we find a marginal effect of the
premium only when political affinity is weak (marginal effect of premium significant at p ≤ .1
when political affinity ranges between 0 and .71) and no effect when political affinity is strong
(marginal effect of premium insignificant with p values above .1 when political affinity ranges
between .72 and 1). In relative terms, we find for weak political affinity (=0) that a one–SD
increase in acquisition premium translates into a 61.5% decrease11 in acquirer CAR relative to
the SD of acquirer CAR, which again implies an economically meaningful effect size. Con-
cerning targets, we expected such a significant positive moderation effect as weak political affin-
ity, as opposed to strong political affinity, increases the likelihood of government intervention
(Bertrand et al., 2016), lowering the likelihood of deal completion (Zhang & He, 2014), and thus
weakening target shareholders' reaction to the acquisition premium (lower positive cumulative
abnormal returns). Regarding acquirers, we argue that for weak political affinity (relative to
FIGURE 1 Interaction plot for target. This figure presents the marginal effects of the premium on CAR for
the target. The solid line represents the estimated marginal effect depending on political affinity as the
continuous moderator variable. The long-dash, dash, short-dash, short dash-dot, and dot lines represent
confidence intervals (upper and lower boundary) with p values of 15, 12.5, 10, 7.5, and 5%
10Calculated as: ((Beta premium +1 × Beta acquisition premium × political affinity) × standard deviation premium)/SD
target's CAR. The corresponding calculation is hence: ((−0.604 + 1 × 0.932) × 0.419)/0.294 = 0.467.
11Calculated as: ((Beta premium + 0 × Beta acquisition premium × political affinity) × SD premium)/SD acquirer's
CAR. The corresponding calculation is hence: ((−0.110) × 0.419)/0.075 = −0.615.
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strong political affinity), the offer price must be high enough for the target not to resist the bid
(Bertrand et al., 2016), increasing the likelihood of value destruction (Li et al., 2020) and thus
strengthening acquirer shareholders' reaction to the acquisition premium (lower negative
cumulative abnormal returns).
Then again, most of our control variables have the expected coefficients.12 For instance,
we find negative coefficients for poison pills (confirming the findings of Schijven and
Hitt (2012)) and positive coefficients for tender offers as well as acquirer Tobin's Q in all
models (both in line with the findings of Li et al. (2020)). Lastly, our adj. R2 is slightly higher
than in similar studies. For instance, Schijven and Hitt (2012) report an adj. R2 of up to 13%
whereas ours ranges between 20.6 and 31.9%, which is likely due to a wider set of fixed
effects employed in our study. Overall, both the coefficients of the control variables as well
as the overall model fit suggest that our models capture a reasonable share of variation of
acquirer and target CARs.
We also perform a battery of robustness tests to ensure the validity of our main
results.13 First, we exclude any firm control variables to reduce the risk of an overfitted
model. Second, we use the factors from the widely used Carhart (1997) four-factor model
instead of using the six factors from our main model to determine abnormal returns to
FIGURE 2 Interaction plot for acquirer. This figure presents the marginal effects of the premium on CAR
for the acquirer. The solid line represents the estimated marginal effect depending on political affinity as the
continuous moderator variable. The long-dash, dash, short-dash, short dash-dot, and dot lines represent
confidence intervals (upper and lower boundary) with p values of 15, 12.5, 10, 7.5, and 5%
12As some of our control variables are scaled by total assets, we may be prone to a ratio error correlation arising from
the repeated inclusion of the same variable as a scaling factor (Farris, Parry, & Ailawadi, 1992; Hitt, Hoskisson, &
Kim, 1997). To mitigate this concern, we follow the recommendation of Wiseman (2009) and repeat our main analysis,
this time including all control variables in unscaled form (i.e., no descaling with total assets). Our results continue
to hold.
13Results tables for all additional tests are available from the authors upon request.
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ensure our results are not sensitive to the economic model selected. Third, we use an alter-
native event window from 3 days before to 3 days after the announcement event to verify
whether our results are sensitive to this methodological choice. Fourth, to analyze how
our findings are affected by the fixed effects (which potentially increase the likelihood of
overfitting), we do not use any fixed effects or use an industry, year, and/or country
demeaning approach instead of the respective fixed effects regression model as another
way to mitigate overfitting concerns. For all robustness checks, we find that the interac-
tion term is positive, similar in magnitude and, in most cases, statistically significant. Our
robustness tests support the empirical evidence provided in Table 2, stating that the rela-
tionship between the acquisition premium and the target/acquirer firm's stock market
return after an acquisition announcement is positively moderated by political affinity
between acquirer and target countries.
5 | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study makes two important contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the
emerging literature that looks at the heterogeneity of bilateral relations in CBAs. With our
focus on political affinity, we directly extend Bertrand et al. (2016). While they provide evi-
dence that managers incorporate political affinity into their perception of a deal's synergis-
tic potential (i.e., premium paid), we additionally show that investors assess a deal and the
acquisition premium paid differently depending on political affinity. As we find a positive
moderation effect for political affinity, we argue that investors of acquirers (targets) are par-
ticularly worried about overpayment (intervention likelihood and deal completion) when
political affinity is weak. Second, we contribute to research on investor reactions from a
behavioral perspective. Here, we connect with Schijven and Hitt (2012) who, using a sample
of deals involving North American acquirers, show that investors' reaction to the acquisi-
tion premium paid is moderated by factors such as industry similarity, acquirer perfor-
mance, and deal characteristics (e.g., payment structure). While these factors are relevant to
all deals (i.e., both domestic deals and CBAs), with political affinity we focus on an impor-
tant factor that is relevant only to CBAs (Bertrand et al., 2016). This is an important exten-
sion, as CBAs introduce additional complexity for investors (in contrast to domestic deals),
and we argue that it is hence ex-ante unclear whether investors are capable of or willing to
incorporate political affinity as another piece in the crude information set available to them
(Schijven & Hitt, 2012) into their assessment of CBAs. Our findings of a positive moderation
effect linked to political affinity suggest that both acquirer and target shareholders indeed
incorporate political affinity into their overall assessment. This is in line with the argument
that investors have incomplete information, use the acquisition premium paid as a proxy for
assessing the reliability of management's perception of a given deal's synergistic potential,
and complement this proxy with political affinity as a major element of bilateral political
relations (Bertrand et al., 2016) when assessing CBAs.
Our results are important from a management perspective. Investors often face crude signals
when assessing acquisitions, particularly the premium paid (Schijven & Hitt, 2012). In the con-
text of CBAs, political affinity may serve as a relevant signal to investors for evaluating the pre-
mium paid (i.e., potential overpayment). This signal should become less relevant if firms
provide more reliable and relevant information to investors, which should in turn allow them
to better manage investors' reactions to deal announcements.
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At the same time, it may be more beneficial for acquiring firms to focus on targets in coun-
tries with a strong political affinity to their own. For governments, our findings illustrate that
their conduct in global affairs may have real economic consequences for their companies. Major
disagreements with other countries may lower the likelihood of M&A deals with these coun-
tries; and even if these deals take place, the terms and conditions may be less favorable, as
shown in Bertrand et al. (2016), and there may be more negative investor reactions to given deal
conditions, as suggested by our study.
Finally, our study has two main limitations that open up avenues for future research. First,
political affinity is an imperfect proxy for the similarity of national interests at the global level.
We focus on UN General Assembly voting behavior as we seek to use a measure that applies to
all countries. Yet international institutions in other geographical regions (e.g., the European
Union and its political bodies) may also be relevant for investors when they assess the acquisi-
tion premium paid. Future research could investigate acquisitions in these regions to see
whether political affinity matters differently there. Second, with our quantitative-empirical
approach, we are unable to identify the actual channels through which political affinity affects
individual investors' reactions (i.e., we can only observe aggregated market returns). Future
studies could conduct investor surveys to better understand the moderation channels of politi-
cal affinity and thereby determine heterogeneous effects depending on investor characteristics
such as risk preference.
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